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MINIMIZING EMPLOYER LIABILITY IN FEDERAL SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
CLAIMS AFTER THE CIVIL RIGHTS AC!r OF 1991 
by 
Bruce L. Haller* and Richard c. Aitken** 
Part I Introduction 
The seriousness of sexual harassment was firmly 
established by the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas hearings held by 
the Senate Judiciary committee in october, 1.991. 1 The 
hearings directed the country's attention to the shortcomings 
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of raee, color, religion, sex or 
natural origin. 2 According to the 1.981 u.s. Merit system 
Protection Board Report, forty-two percent of the women who 
were questioned had answered that they had been subjected to 
some form of sexual harassment. 3 Unfortunately, in 1988 when 
the Board conducted the same survey, the results were 
identical4 ; moreover, the percentage was even greater in male 
do11inated workplaces. ' 
The victims of sexual harassment6 not only become less 
efficient employees, but also suffer depression, loss of 
confidence as well as, physical effects. 7 In addition to the 
toll it takes on the employee, sexual harassment costs the 
federal government over a hundred million dollars a year. 8 
The money represents the cost of absenteeism, reduced 
productivity, job turnover, medical costs, and litigation.9 
Finally, sexual harassment creates an offensive working 
condition that alienates its victims and decreases job morale. 
It is therefore in the best interests of employers, 
employees and soci ety to prevent all forms of sexual 
harassment. Short of this employers ean take steps to 
minimize their liability in Title VII s exual harassment 
claims. 
Part II of this article will review the evolution of 
sexual harassment claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. Part III outlines how the 1964 Act was changed 
by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Part IV outlines the 
procedures an employer may implement to minimize their 
liability. 
Chair, Management Department, School of Business 
Dowling College, Oakdale, Hew York 
Attorney, Brightwaters, New York 
( 
Part II Eyoluti on of Sexual Harassment Claims 
A... Background 
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Although sexual harassment10 is currently actionable 
under Title VII, claims of -sexual harassment had fallen on 
deaf ears until 1976.11 Prior to this, the courts had held 
that victims of sexual harassment had no recourse under Title 
VII. 12 For example, the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia in Barnes v. Train denied a plaintiff 
relief under Title VII because she had not been discriminated 
against on the basis of her sex, but rather on the basis of 
her refusal to submit to the sexual advances.n Thus, in 
order to recover a plaintiff had to use the traditional tort 
theories of assault, battery, defamation, or intentional 
infliction of emotiopal distress. 14 
It should be noted that, even though Title VII was 
proposed to eliminate all barriers to employment for all, the 
provision regarding sex discrimination was only added as a 
last-minute attempt to defeat the act. 15 Presently Title VII 
not only prohibits sex discrimination in all of its forms, 
section 704 of Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating 
against employees who initiate complaints •. 16 
In 1976 the District court of the District of Columbia 
became the first district court to recognize a sexual 
harassment claim under Title VII . 17 The plaintiff, Diane 
Williams, who was an employee of the Justice Department 
refused to submit to sexual advances of her supervisor. In 
response, her supervisor retaliated with unfavorable reviews 
and unwarranted reprimands. The district court determined 
that the supervisor's retaliatory measures discriminated 
against Ms. Williams on the basis of her sex and was therefore 
a violation of Title 
In the aftermath of Williams, courts started to recognize 
sexual harassment as actionable action under Title VII. 
However, a majority of the courts required that the plaintiff 
show a loss of a tangible job benefit. a This type of 
harassment has been referred to as quid pro quo harassment or 
"this for that" harassment. Quid pro quo sexual harassment 
involves conduct of a sexual nature when submission to such 
conduct is made explicitly or implicitly a term or condition 
of employment or when submission or rejection of such conduct 
is used as a basis for employment decisions affecting the 
Therefore when a supervisory employee conditions 
concrete employment benefits on sexual favors, he imposes an 
additional burden on subordinate employees that they need not 
suffer. As a result, an employer may be sued for the action 
of the supervisor . 21 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Co:mmission drafted a set 
of guidelines regarding the problem of sexual harassment in 
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the workplace.n The guidelines reinforced the various court 
rulings regarding quid pro quo harassment and then went a step 
further, defining sexual harassment as: 
(R)equests for sexual favors, and other verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual 
harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made 
either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an 
individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection 
of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for 
employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) 
such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably 
interfering with an individual's work performance or 
creating an intimidating, bostile, or offensive work 
enviroll111ent23 
According to the EEOC's a plaintiff does not 
have to show that she suffered from a loss of tangible job 
benefit but rather that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual 
advances, jokes, suggestive remarks or comments, physical 
touching, or the displaying of objectional material in the 
workplace rising to the level of creating an offensive or 
hostile working environment. 25 The hostile work environment 
claim differs from the quid pro quo claim, because it is not 
limited to harassment by one with authority to make 
substantive employment decisions. 
To promote hostile work environment as a valid claixa for 
sexual harassment, the EEOC's guidelines call for the strict 
liability for employers regardless of whether they knew or 
should have known of the discriminatory acts of its agents or 
supervisors. The guidelines state: 
Applying general Title VII principles, an employer, ••. is 
responsible for its acts and those of its agents and 
supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment 
regardless of whether the specific acts complained of 
were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and 
regardless of whether the employer knew or should have 
known of their occurrence. The commission will examine 
the circumstances of the particular employment 
relationship and the job function performed by the 
individual in determining whether an individual acts in 
either a supervisory or agency capacity. 26 After the 
release of the Guidelines, the courts agreed that hostile 
enviromnent sexual harassment claims are actionable under 
Title VII77 • In Bundy y, Jackson28 the circuit court for 
the District of Columbia announced that hostile work 
environment sexual harassment violates Title VII of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act. The court based its decision on 
Title VII race discrimination The court stated: 
Indirect discrimination is illegal because it may 
constitute a subtle scheme designed to create a working 
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environment imbued with discrimination and directed 
ultimately at minority group employees. As potentially 
discriminated _practices become outlawed, those employers 
bent on pursuing a general policy declared illegal by 
congressional mandate will undoubtedly devise more 
sophisticated methods to perpetrate discrimination among 
Qlllployees. 30 
The circuit court in Bundy recognized both quid pro quo 
and hostile environment sexual harassment. The court stated 
that by only allowing quid pro quo actions the courts are 
condoning the actions of employers who sexually harass their 
workers but stop before dismissing or depriving an employee of a tangible job 
In similar fashion, the Eleventh Circuit held that 
hostile environment sexual harassment violates Title VII in 
Henson y. Ci t v of Dundee. 32 Barbara Henson was a dispatcher 
for the city of Dundee's police department. She claimed that 
during the two years she had worked for the department she and 
her female eo-workers were subject to "numerous harangues of 
demeaning sexual inquiries and vulgarities."" :rn addition, 
she alleged that her supervisor had repeatedly asked her to 
have sexual relations with him. In reversing the lower Courts 
decision, which denied her claim because she had not lost a 
tangible job benefit, the court set forth a five point 
analytical frame work for hostile environment claim. 
According to Henson, the elements for a prima facie case 
of hostile environment sexual harassment are (1) the employee 
belongs to a protected group; (2) the employee was subjected 
to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment complained 
of was based on sex; (4) the harassment complained of affected 
a "term, condition or privilege" of employment; (5) employer 
knew or should known of the harassment in question and 
failed to take prompt remedial 
Meritor Sayings Bank FSB v 
In 1986, the issue of sexual harassment reached the 
United States Supreme Court. 36 In 1974, Michelle Vinson, 
respondent, met Sidney Taylor of Capital City Federal Savings 
and Loan Association (now Meritor Savings Bank) and discussed 
the possibility of employment. Vinson was eventually hired 
with Taylor as her supervisor and started as a teller-trainer. 
Thereafter she was promoted to teller, head teller, and 
assistant Branch Manager. She worked at the same branch for 
four years and i t is. undisputed that all of her promotions 
were based on merit. 37 In September of 1978 Vinson notified 
Taylor that she was taking sick leave for an indefinite period 
and on November 1, 1978, she was discharged from the bank for excessive use of that leave. 
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Pursuant to this Vinson brought a Title VII action 
against Taylor and the bank alleging that "she bad been 
constantly subjected to sexual harassment" by Taylor. 38 
At trial, Vinson testified that shortly after her 
probationary period was concluded Taylor had asked her out to 
dinner and while at dinner he suggested that they go to a 
motel and have sexual relations. out of what she described as 
fear of losing her job, Vinson agreed. Vinson further 
testified that Taylor had made repeated sexual demands upon 
her and that during the course of her employment she had 
intercourse with him 40-50 times: In addition, she testified 
that Taylor had fondled her in front of other employees, 
followed her into the ladies room, exposed himself to her, and 
forcibly raped her several 
The District Court held for Taylor and the Bank. The 
court concluded that: 
[if) Vinson and Taylor did engage in an intimate sexual 
relationship, during the time of her employment with the 
bank, the relationship was a voluntary one having nothing 
to do with her continued employment with the bank or her 
advancement for promotions at the 
The court also concluded that the bank was not in violation of 
Title VII because "the bank was without notice and cannot be 
held liable for the alleged actions of Taylor••. 41 
The District Court's holdinq was reversed by the court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia.QDrawing support from 
its decision in Bundy y. Jacksonc and the EEOC Guidelines the 
court announced that a violation Gf Title VII may be based 
upon either quid pro quo sexual harassment or hostile 
environment sexual harassment. Therefore since the Appellate 
Court believed that Vinson's allegations were clearly of the 
hostile environment and concluded the District Court 
had not addressed the issue, the court remanded the case. 
In regard to the bank's liability the Court of Appeals 
held that an employer is absolutely liable for the sexually 
harassing conduct of its supervisory p&rsonnel, regardless of 
whether the employee knew or should have known about the 
misconduct. The Court concluded that Title VII's definition 
of "employer" includes "any agent of such person", 4S 
Therefore, the court held that a supervisor is an agent of his 
employer for Title VII purposes.% 
The court of Appeals' decision was affirmed by the 
Supreme Court, but on other grounds. The court determined 
that "the language of Title VII is not limited to "economic" 
or "tangible" discrimination. The phrase "terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment" evidences a legislative intent 
"to strike at this entire spectrum of disparate treatment of 
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men and women. " 47 The court also relied on the EEOC 
Guidelines41 in determining that sexual·harassment, regardless 
of whether or not there is any loss of a tangible job benefit 
is actionable under. Title VII. The court did however, caution 
that: 
Not all workplace conduct that may be described as 
"harassment" affects a ''term, condition, or privilege" or 
employment within the meaning of Title VII. For sexual 
harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently 
severe or pervasive "to alter the conditions of [the 
actions] employment and create an abrasive working 
environment. 1149 
In regard to employer liability the Court disagreed with 
the Court of Appeals' decision that employers should be held 
absolutely liable for the conduct of its 
Although the court refused to give a definitive answer on 
employer liability, it did agree with the amicus curiae brief 
by the EEOC which stated "that Congress wanted courts to look 
to agency principles for guidance in this area.s1 
Finally, the court rejected the bank's view that the 
existence of a grievance procedure and policy against 
discrimination, insulates the bank from liability. The 
the . court gave are two-fold. First, the bank's po_licy 
not address sexual harassment in particular. Secondly, 
the bank's procedure required an employee to report any 
discrimination to her supervisor. Therefore, since Taylor was 
Vinson's supervisor it is quite evident why she did not choose 
to implement the grievance procedure.» 
Burdens of Proof in Sexual Harassment Cases 
Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment 
Quid pro quo sexual harassment claims are similar to the 
traditional discrimination claims under Title VII. Therefore, 
in order to establish a quid pro quo claim53 a plaintiff must 
use the tripartite framework for proving a Title VII claim of 
disparate treatment established by the supreme court in 
McDonnell Poualas Corp . v. The plaintiff must first 
establish by a of the evidence she was denied 
a tangible job benefit because she refused to submit to the 
sexual advances of her supervisor. Upon doing so the burden 
of proof shifts back to the employer to demonstrate by clear 
and convincing evidence that it had a legitimate, non 
discriminatory reason for denying the plaintiff of this 
benefit. Finally, if the employer is able to meet this burden 
of proof, the plaintiff has the opportunity to show that the 
employer' s stated "legitimate" reason is pretextual and 
unworthy of credence, s5 
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Evidence of sexual advances made to other employees may 
be admitted on this issue of motive, intent, or plan in making 
the sexual advances toward the plaintiff. 56 In regards to 
imputing liability for quid pro quo sexual harassment, the 
federal courts have held employers strictly liable, based on 
agency For example, in the Sixth Circuit case 
of Shrout v. The Black. Clawson co." the District Court for 
the southern District of Ohio found the employer stri ctly 
liable for the acts of a supervisor who attempted to force the 
plaintiff ''to submit to his sexual advances bj withholding 
performance evaluations and salary reviews." The court 
stated : 
Respondeat superior liability exists because in a quid 
pro quo action "an employer is held strictly liable for 
the conduct of supervisory employees having plenary 
authority over hiring, advancement, dismissal and 
discipline ••• " 110 
similarly, in sowers y. Kemira61 the District court for the 
southern District of Georgia held an employer strictly liable 
for quid pro quo sexual harassment by its supervisor, Mr. 
Skinner. The court records show that Mr. Skinner made 
numerous sexual advances to the plaintiff, many of which 
occurred during discussion regarding the possibility of her 
promotion. Citing Henson y. City of Dundee, the district 
court held the employer liable on the basis of agency because 
the supervisor was using "his apparent or actual authority to 
extort sexual consideration from an employee .•• {T]he 
supervisor uses the means furnished to him by the employer to 
accomplish the prohibited purpose."62 
Opponents to implying strict liability on employers argue 
that supervisors who practice quid pro quo sexual harasSl'llent 
are acting outside of their scope of employment. Therefore, 
their argument continues, an employer should not be held 
liable for the consequences of these acts. 63 Although at 
first this appears to be a valid defense, upon c l oser 
examination this theory is flawed. 
While it is correct that a master is not liable for the 
torts of his servants committed while acting outside their 
scope of employment, the Restatement (second) of Agency lists 
four exceptions to the general rule. The two exceptions which 
are applicable to quid pro quo sexual harassment claims are 
that the: 
(b) "master was negligent or reckless, or •.. 
(d) The servant purported to act or to speak on behalf 
of the principal and there was reliance upon 
apparent authority, or he was aided in 
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the 
agency relation." 
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The first exception cited is in the Eighth 
circuit case of Hall v. Gus Construction co •• <>s In .H2ll the 
plaintiffs were a group of women who work on one of the 
co11pany•s crews and were subj ect to various sorts of sexual 
harassment by their Although the court 
acknowledges that the harassment was not within the scope of 
employment it still imposed liability on the employer stating: 
[A)n employer is directly liable •• • for those torts 
committed against one employee by another, whether or not 
committed in furtherance of the employer's business, that 
the employer could have prevented by reasonable care in 
hiring, supervising, or if necessary firing the tort feasor.({l 
Therefore, although an act of sexual harassment may be outside 
the scope of employment, the employer may still be held liable 
if the plaintiff can prove that the employer was negligent in 
hiring, or supervising the supervisor. 
Strict liability may be imposed by the second 
aforementioned exception when the supervisor uses the 
existence of the agency relation to accomplish his tort. This 
exception is the very basis upon which quid pro quo sexual 
harassment claims are based. By simply being in the position 
to hire, make recommendations, promote, supervise, and fire an 
employee, a supervisor has the and power by the 
existence of his agency relationship with the employer, to 
carry out all forms of sexual harassment. It would, 
therefore, be grossly inequitable to refuse to impose direct 
liability on an employer when one of its supervisors uses his 
relationship with his employer to sexually harass employees under him. 
Hostile Environment Harassment 
The primary procedure to proving a hostile environment 
sexual harassment was set forth by the eleventh circuit in 
Henson v. City of The court made it demonstrably 
clear that an employee 's psychological well being is a term 
and condition of employment. The court further declared that 
the issue of sexual harassment must be viewed under the 
totality of circumstances. Finally, once the plaintiff 
establishes the five elements outlined in Henson the second 
and third step of the McDonnell Doug las test are triggered. 
The Henson test has not been used without criticism. The 
element concerning the unwelcomeness of the harassment, as 
well as, the element regarding employer liability has come 
under fire. The sixth circuit case of Rabidue y. osceola 
Refining co • . 70 provides an excellent illustration of the 
shortcomings of the unwelcomeness requirement. 
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Vivienne Rabidue was the only female administrative 
assistant at the Osceola Refining Company. After her 
discharge in 1977, she filed a sexual harassment claim against 
her employer, She charged that her employer's refusal to stop 
the display of pornographic posters in private offices and 
common work areas at the company plant, as well as anti-female 
obscenities directed at her and other women by a co-worker in 
another department, constituted sexual discrimination in 
violation of Title VII. 71 Furthermore, she introduced evidence 
that she had been denied various managerial privileges 
accorded to male employees and in other ways had been given 
secondary status in the company,n 
The conduct which Rabidue complained of was not mild and 
ambiguous. Pictures of nude and scantily clad women abounded 
at the company, including one that had hung on the wall for 
eight years. This poster depicted a prone women with a golf 
ball on her breasts, straddled by a man holding a golf club 
and yelling, "Fore". 73 The language of co-workers was equally 
offensive. They engaged in generally uncooperative behavior 
that i.Jipaired Rabidue's ability to perform her job 
effectively,,. 
In writing for the majority, and applying the "reasonable 
man" standard in deciding whether or not the conduct 
complained of was unwelcome, Judge Krupansky held that the 
conduct complained of was not sufficiently severe or pervasive 
to alter the conditions of their employment. The court 
characterized the conduct as a legitimate expression of the 
cultural norms of the workers at the employer's plant and 
stated: 
[I)t cannot be disputed that in some work 
environments humor and language are rough hewn and 
vulgar. Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and 
girlee magazines may abound. Title VII was not 
meant to or can change this. It must never be 
forgotten that Title VII is the federal court's 
mainstay in the struggle for equal employment 
opportunity for the female workers of America. But 
it is quite different to claim that Titl e VII was 
designed to bring about a magical transformation in 
the social mores of American workers. 75 
The court further argued that Rabidue had voluntarily and 
knowingly entered the Osceola workplace and therefore could 
not complain about the conditions she encountered 
Rabidue was denied any relief under Title VII. 
Despite the fact that the court attempted to make a 
proper assignment regarding the alleged sexual harassment at 
osceola, the opinion in Rabidue reflected patriarchal 
attitudes about women. In the court's assertion that a proper 
assessment of a hostile environment claim includes evidence 
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about the personality of the plaintiff,n the court minimized 
the conduct engaged in at Osceo1a and reflected the common 
male attitude that the victim of harassment is to blame for 
her mistreatment." Many men believe that women can avoid 
harassment if they behave properly and that the tactful 
of a complaint is usually an effective way of 
harassment when it the court's 
:foc1;1s on the character of the victilll110 echoes these :male 
and thus undermines the 11neutrality" of its 
It has, therefore, been argued that by employing the 
man standard the courts cannot provide a neutral 
for the definition of discrimination because the courts 
·neutral analysis contains a hidden male perspective. In lieu 
of this the dissent in Rabidue advocated the use of the reasonable victim standard . u 
Although the sixth circuit has not expressly overturned 
its in Rabidue, it bas called Rabidue into 
at least two subsequent opinions. In Yates v , 
, the court stated, "We acknowledge that men and women 
are vulnerable in different ways and offended by different 
behavior."u In lieu of this, the court adopted the 
"reasonable victim" standard which was one of the main 
arguments in the Rabidue dissent. 
In Dayis v . Monsanto Cbemical Co." the sixth circuit 
Rabidue•s limited reading of Title VII. 
the court qualified its statement in Rabidue 
read "Title [was) not designed to being about a 
in the social mores of American 
workers."u The court, in Davis, emphasized: 
In reading this passage, however, one should place the 
emphasis on the word ":magical" not the word 
VII was not intended to eliminate 
all private prejudice and biases. That law 
did alter the dynamics of the workplace 
operates to prevent bigots from harassing their co-workers.86 
addition to the sixth circuit questioning its decision 
in courts have rejected it in its entirety. 
For 1991, the ninth circuit in Ellison y . 
adopted the reasonable woman standard as opposed to the 
reasonable man standard. Kerry Ellison worked as a revenue 
agent for the Internal Revenue service in san Mateo 
C l .f · 88 ft · ' a A er turn1ng down several requests for dates 
from a co-w?rJ:ter, she began to receive "love letters."39 The 
court rejected the reasoning in Rabidue and 
employed the reasonable woman standard because men and women 
have different opinions of what type of conduct is 
In fact, the court stated that "If we only 
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exaDined whether a reasonable person would engage in allegedly 
harassing conduct, we would run the r i sk of reinforcing the 
prevailing level of discrimination. 1191 Therefore, a plaintiff 
can prove a prima facie case for bostile environment sexual 
harassment by showing "conduct which a reasonable woman would 
consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 
conditions of employment and create an abusive working 
environment."92 
.A few district courts across the country have also 
adopted the reasonable woman standard. In Spencer y. Gener al 
Electric co.n, the District court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia employed the reasonable woman standard and found 
"[t]hat the conduct complained of would have interfered with 
the work performance and would have seriously affected the 
psychological well-being of a reasonable female employee. 1194 
similarl y, the District court f or the Middle District of 
Florida in Robinson y. Jacksonville Shipyard . Inc. 95 used the 
reasonable woman standard to determine that pervasive 
pornographic pictures, sexual verbal harassment, 
abusive graffiti, and unwelcome touching of some of the 
plaintiff's female co-workers created a hostile 
Finally, as recently as October, 1992, the District court of 
Nevada i n Canada v. Tbe Boyd Group. used the reasonable 
woman standard in denying the defendant's motion for summary 
judgement.93 
Notwithstanding this seetting emergence of the reasonable 
woman standard, the reasonable person standard can not be so 
easily discarded. In the recent unanimous Suprem.e Court 
decision regarding Harris, the court discarded the reasonable 
woman standard in favor of the reasonable person standard 
removing gender from the harassment 
The facts of the case reveal that Teresa Harris, a former 
rental manager of Forklift systems, was allegedly subjected to 
unwanted sexual comments by the owner. Harris accused the 
owner of making derogatory comments such as, •• [ 1] et' s go to 
the Holiday Inn to negotiate your raise;" forcing Harris and 
other female employees to retrieve coins from his front 
pocket; and throwing things on the floor, then asking women to 
pick them up while he commented suggestively on their 
clothes . 100 Although the trial judge acknowledged that the 
owner's behavior was crude, vulgar, and offensive, he ruled 
against Harris because he found that she had not suffered 
serious psychological injury. •m The supreme Court, Harris v 
Forklift s ystems . Inc., struck down the narrow interpretation 
of the federal sexual harassment law, instead taking a middle 
of the road approach stating, "a discriminatory abusive work 
environment, even one that does not seriously affect the 
employee's psychological well-being, can and often will 
detract from the employee's job performance, discourage 
employees from on the job or keep them from 
advancing their careers . " 02 
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Notwithstanding which standard is used, once a plaintiff 
that the sexual harassment has in fact occurred he or 
she burdened with the additional task of proving employer 
liability. 1113 The fourth circuit in Katz y. Dole•04 further 
refined the analytical framework of Henson and opined that: 
the plaintiff Jnust . demonstrate that the employer had 
actual or knowledge of the existence of a 
sexually hostile working environment and took no prompt 
and ade9Uate remedial action. The plaintiff may do this 
by _that complaints were lodged with the employee 
or that the harassment was so pervasive that the 
employer's may be inferred. Thus, we posit a 
two step First the plaintiff must make a prima 
facie showing that sexually harassing actions took place 
if is done, the employer may rebut the showing 
by proving the events did not take 
indirectly by showing that they were isolated 
or tr1v1al. second, the plaintiff must show that the 
employer knew or should have known of the harassment and 
took.no effectual action to correct the situation. 'This 
can also be rebutted by the employer directly or 
by to prompt r emedial action calculated to end the 
. its own rule, the court in Katz imposed 
on the even though the agency did have an 
policy place because it was not effective 
and known to be not effective by the employer's superv 106 
Not all have been as fortunate as Ms. Katz. 
The seventh t held a female factory worker 
failed. to a VII cla1m when her claim was based 
a in which a co-worker made crude physical 
Jokes 1n of a sexual advance and the employees 
promptly d1scipl1ned the co-worker and the behavior was not 
a discharged engineering technician 
fal.led to establ1sh a claim of hostile environment sexual 
harassment at.a glass factory where sexually suggestive nude 
photos were at the plant. The use of gender-based 
references . to personnel, and whis tles from male co-workers 
were met prompt, remedial management 
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Part III - The Civil Rights Act of 1991 
Legal liability for unlawful acts of sexual harassment is 
now accompanied by significant monetary liability as a result 
of the civil Rights Act of Signed by President Bush 
on November 21, 1991, the Act has implemented a series of 
sweeping changes to federal anti-discrimination laws that 
expands the scope and amount of monetary relief available to 
prevailing plaintiffs, and also expands the types of conduct 
that may be deemed discriminatory under the law •110 The Act 
went into effect on the date of enactment and is not 
retroactive. 111 
With passage of the amended law, a sexually harassed 
employee can now sue for more than the remedies ,available 
under Title VII which are injunctive relief and/or 
reinstatement, back pay, front pay and attorney• s fees. 
Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides for the 
possibility of recovery of compensatory punitive damages for 
victims of intentional employment discrimination on the basis 
of sex, religion, and disability. 112 A sexually harassed 
employee may therefore, sue for the pai n and suffering caused 
by the discrimination (compensatory damages) and for an 
additional amount that serves to punish the employer (punitive 
da.mages). 113 Punitive damages are available when the employer 
deliberately planned to discriminate against an employee or 
acted without caring whether or not the employee would suffer 
when it was obvious that the employee would suffer. 114 
The damage awards granted under the new act are capped at 
$50,000 for companies of 100 or fewer workers, $100,000 for 
companies with 101 to 200 employees, $200,000 for employers 
with 201 to 500 employees and $300,000 for employees of over 
500 employees.m 
In addition, jury trials are now available in Title VII 
claims by any party to a discrimination action if the 
complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages. 116 
FUrthermore, since experts play an important role in sexual 
harassment cases, 117 the 1991 Act provides that expert witness 
fees are available in Title VII cases.m 
Part IY Steps Employers Can Take to Ayoid Liability 
In addition to refuting the elements to a sexual 
harassment claim119 an employer may improve the possibility of 
avoiding liability by implementing a strong viable anti-
harassment policy. A strong policy promotes an understanding 
of harassment throughout an organization and makes everyone 
aware of the legal consequences of violating the policy. 
Having a written policy can reduce the risk of liability 
because harassment is least likely to occur when employees are 
aware of the rules. 120 As one com.menter has said "Once a 
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company has a corporate policy, men are much more careful. 
Policies make employees more aware. 121 It is therefore 
imperative that all companies devise a policy that: 
• • 
• 
• 
states that sexual harassment will not be tolerated 
defines both quid pro quo and hostile environment 
harassment 
outlines a procedure for employees to make 
complaints about sexual harassment to a person with 
authority to resolve the complaint. 
guarantees that all complaints will be treated 
confidentially. 
• guarantees that employees who complain about sexual 
harassment will not suffer adverse job consequences 
as a result of the complaint, and 
• states that an employee who engages in sexual 
harassment is subject to discipline up to and 
including discharge. 122 
The company's policy should be outlined in a memo and 
distributed to all employees "using whatever the usual trusted 
mechanisms of the company are .•. "123 The anti-harassment 
policy should also be contained, in its entirety, in any 
employee handbook that the company may furnish. 
The procedure for filing of complaints should encourage 
employees to come forward and report the incidents of sexual 
harassment. It is important that there are at least two 
employees of the company in high level positions who will 
investigate the allegations and make the appropriate 
recommendations. It would be prudent to make sure that these 
two employees are from different departments in case the 
alleged harassment claim is against one of these 
All complaints should be handled in a serious matter and 
investigated confidentially by trained personnel. The 
investigator should not only investigate the act complained of 
but should also find out if the employer was aware of any 
other instances of harassment. 1u Once the investigation is 
complete, the investigator should meet with management and 
recommend the possible remedial actions that should be taken. 
The employer's remedial action should be reasonably 
calculated to end the harassment, make the action whole and 
prevent any future misconduct. By taking immediate remedial 
action, an employer has utilized his best defense to Title VII 
claims. 125 Normally if the EEOC finds that the harassment 
has been eliminated, the victim made whole, and the preventive 
measures instituted, it will normally drop the charge . 
In addition to the implementation of a strong anti-
harassment policy, employers must educate their employees as 
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to what conduct the law considers to be sexual harassment. 
The education program must stress that any type of UnWelcome 
sexual conduct is strictly prohibited. Furthermore, the 
program should stress that an employee who voluntarily 
partakes in such conduct may still consider it unwelcome but 
feel as if she has no choice but to submit to such conduct. 
Finally, educating the employees .about the existence of 
and the matter in which an anti-harassment complaint procedure 
operates is as important as the details of the procedure 
itself. This may be accomplished through training seminars, 
that should be ongoing and presented on company time. 
Moreover, whatever policy a given company asserts as a defense 
will have little effect if the court deems that such policy 
was neither known or readily acceptable to the 
Part Y conclusion 
In light of the popularity and political correctness of 
sexual harass1nent claims since the Thomas hearing, it is 
imperative that an employer takes the appropriate steps to 
limit his or her liability. Therefore, since the standard for 
liability has not yet been clearly expressed by the supreme 
Court, the best way for an employe.r to escape liability is 
through prevention . The employer should not only implement a 
sexual harassment policy, but should also educate their 
employees as to what constitutes sexual harassment, develop 
appropriate sanctions, and inform employees of their right to 
raise the issue under Title VII. Once an employer has done 
this, a court will be reluctant to find liability if the 
implemented policy had been adhered to. 
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COMMERCIAL PAPER FORGERIES: A COMPLETE 
ONE-HOUR LESSON 
by 
Arthur M. Magaldi* 
The members of the Academy of Legal Studies in Business 
have increasingly turned their attention and emphasis to the 
pedagogical aspect of our profession. This increased interest 
in the actual teaching of our material has given rise to many 
initiatives, for example, the publication of the Journal of 
Legal studies Education and a teaching symposium at the annual 
convention of the Academy. In that collegial spirit of 
sharing teaching ideas which have been effectively used in the 
classroom, the following material is submitted as a lesson 
which students have found to be worthwhile. No suggestion is 
made that it is a model lesson. It is a lesson, however, 
which develops in a concise manner a number of principles 
concerning commercial paper forgeries. The lesson also 
develops a number of learning aids for students. 
Implicit in the writing of this paper is the strongly 
held belief of the author that it is valuable for teachers of 
business lawflegal environment courses to make available to 
approaches that have been found pedagogically 
effective. The lesson includes some mild attempts at levity, 
but they are not essential to the structure of the lesson. An 
outline of the lesson is provided in Appendix A. 
The lesson on forgeries begins with the instructor asking 
the students a rather simple question: "What does the bank 
contract to do, in general terms, when a depositor opens a 
c;mecking account?" After eliciting a number of responses, the 
1nstructor leads the students to the conclusion that the bank 
agrees to pay properly drawn checks on the account to the 
holders of the checks up to the balance in the account. The 
instructor may write the terrns "properly drawn" and "holders" 
on the chalkboard for emphasis. 
*Professor of Business Law, Pace University 
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